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Abstract
Background: A large number of end-of-life decisions are made by a next-of-kin for a patient who has
lost their decision-making capacity. This has given rise to investigations into how surrogates make these
decisions. The experimental perspective has focused on examining how the decisions we make for others
differ from our own, whereas the qualitative perspective has explored surrogate insights into making these
decisions.
Methods: We conducted a mixed methods study to bring these two perspectives together. This is crucial to
comparing decision outcomes to the decision process. We asked older adult partners to make end-of-life
decisions for each other. They then took part in a semi-structured interview about their decision process.
Transcripts were analysed using thematic analysis.
Results: 24 participants took part in the study. Surrogates were more likely to take a life-saving treatment at
the risk of a diminished quality of life for their partner than for themselves. This was consistent with their
transcripts which showed that they wanted to give their partner a better chance of living. Although there
was evidence of surrogate inaccuracy in the decision task, participants overwhelmingly reported their
intention to make a decision which aligns with the substituted judgment standard. However, uncertainty
about their wishes pushed them to consider other factors.
Conclusions: Taking a mixed methods approach allowed us to make novel comparisons between decision outcome
and process. We found that the intentions of surrogates broadly align with the expectations of the substituted
judgment standard and that previous discussions with their partner helps them to make a decision.
Keywords: Surrogate decision-making, Self-other differences, End-of-life, Substituted judgment standard, Mixed
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Background
In the event that a patient has lost their decision-making
capacity due to illness or injury, it is common for a
next-of-kin to take on the role of a surrogate to make
medical decisions on their behalf. In the United States
(US), at least 70% of intensive care unit deaths are the
result of decisions to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining treatment, but only about 5% of patients are
able to make these decisions for themselves [1]. If the
patient has not written an advance directive, it is usually
the case that the next-of-kin will act as a surrogate.
Given the increase in age-related illnesses in westernised
countries, the need for surrogates is growing [2].
An ethical framework of surrogate decision-making was
developed almost three decades ago, of which the under-
pinning principles remain representative of current legisla-
tion in many western countries1 [3]. The ethical framework
stated that if an advance directive is available, it should be
followed. Otherwise, the substituted judgment standard
should be applied, whereby the surrogate must decide
based on their knowledge of the patient’s preferences – i.e.
make the decision that the patient would have wanted.
When little is known about the patient’s preferences, the
best interest standard applies whereby the option which
provides the best possible outcome is chosen. The exact
use and implementation of these principles varies. For ex-
ample, legislation in the United Kingdom (UK) combines
the substituted judgment standard with the best interest
standard and states in the US are moving towards the best
interest standard. Nevertheless, the substituted judgment
standard continues to be used and is worth assessing.
The substituted judgment standard assumes that surro-
gates can accurately predict patients’ preferences and that
they are willing to decide based on these predictions.
However, concerns have been raised regarding its validity.
Firstly, surrogates report distressing experiences due to
the difficulty of making a decision they are comfortable
with whilst respecting the patient’s wishes [4]. Patients re-
port they would like family members and physicians to in-
put in the decision process, rather than it being solely
based on their own preferences [5]. Secondly, the assump-
tion that surrogates can accurately predict patients’ wishes
has been heavily questioned. A systematic review found
that surrogates can predict their next-of-kin’s treatment
preferences around 68% of the time [6]. Moreover, surro-
gates are biased towards predicting that patients would
want to be treated, making them more accurate in cases
where patients are favourable to treatment [7]. Finally,
even if surrogates had full knowledge of the patient’s
preferences, do they decide according to them? In this
paper, we aim to further our understanding of how surro-
gates make these decisions.
How do surrogates make decisions?
There have been qualitative investigations of surrogates’ ex-
perience of making these decisions after they have taken
place [4, 8–11]. These show that surrogates do consider the
patient’s wishes, either by recalling previous conversations or
their shared experiences, but they are not the sole focus of
their accounts. Other factors can conflict with deciding in ac-
cordance with the patient’s wishes, such as their own values
or preserving the patient’s life or the family’s well-being. In-
deed, surrogate decisions are often biased towards the
decision-maker’s own preferences [12, 13]. Consequently,
the substituted judgment standard cannot always be met.
Parallel to this literature, a strand of experimental re-
search has found that we are more likely to choose the
option with the lowest risk of death for others [14, 15].
However, for ourselves, we are more likely to choose the
option which might increase our chances of dying in
order to avoid an illness [16] or complications from tak-
ing a treatment [17]. This has been explained by profes-
sional accountability when medical professionals make
decisions [18]. When the general population decide for a
stranger or family member, the reasons are not clear
[19–21]. Interestingly, discrepancies have been found be-
tween surrogate choices and predictions. Surrogates
avoid a risk of death for someone else more than them-
selves, despite predicting that they have similar prefer-
ences [22–24]. This suggests that surrogates override the
recipient’s preferences to make a more cautious decision
on their behalf which preserves their chances of living.
Psychological theories of surrogate decision-making
Tunney and Ziegler’s model [2] puts forward that surrogates
engage in various forms of perspective taking when making
a decision. The importance they give to each perspective de-
pends on the nature of the decision. For end-of-life decisions
– highly significant decisions for which the surrogate can be
held accountable – the model predicts that surrogates focus
on what is required of them. If the best interests standard
should be followed, the surrogate will engage in benevolent
perspective-taking (i.e. decide based on what the recipient
should do). If the substituted judgment standard should be
followed, the surrogate will engage in simulated perspective-
taking (i.e. predict what the recipient would do and decide
accordingly), particularly if they are close to the recipient and
know their wishes. However, the surrogate might also engage
in an egocentric perspective (i.e. decide based on what the
surrogate wants) to preserve their own interest. If the surro-
gate has incomplete knowledge of the recipient’s preferences,
they might rely on a projected perspective (i.e. decide based
on what they would do if they were the recipient). Although
1The specific legislation regarding the conditions under which
surrogate decision-making occurs and the procedure it follows varies
from country to country, although similar ethical principles are applied
in westernised countries.
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the model expects a next-of-kin to focus on a simulated per-
spective, other perspectives might come into play which pre-
vent strict adherence to the substituted judgment standard.
Other theories make predictions regarding when self-
other differences occur. The presence of a hot-cold em-
pathy gap between the surrogate and the recipient would
lead surrogates to underestimate the intensity of the recip-
ient’s emotional state, such as a patient’s pain [25]. The
risk-as-feelings hypothesis expects reduced emotional reac-
tions to the prospect of a risk when deciding for someone
else [26]. Both assume that surrogate decision-making is
no different from one’s own decision process – self-other
differences are only a reflection of the psychological dis-
tance between the surrogate and the recipient, i.e. how
close they are to each other [27]. Finally, social values the-
ory suggests that social values are the key factor taken into
account when making surrogate decisions and self-other
differences should arise when taking a risk is socially val-
ued or frowned upon [28]. None of these accounts are
able to capture the intricacies of making surrogate end-of-
life decisions, which is likely to be a much more complex
and reflective process. Tunney and Ziegler’s model [2], in
assuming that surrogates engage in perspective-taking, is
more able to support an understanding of how surrogates
navigate such complex medical decisions. It can conceptu-
alise the tensions felt by surrogates when needing to abide
by the substituted judgment standard and is therefore well
suited to analysing surrogate decisions.
The present research
So far, quantitative studies have looked at self-other differ-
ences in treatment scenarios, whereas qualitative studies
have focused on the experiences of surrogates without
taking into account the specific clinical content of deci-
sions made. We do not yet know much about end-of-life
scenarios other than qualitative reports taken place after
the fact. There is therefore scope for research that can
bridge the gap between the decisions that surrogates make
and the reasons they give for doing so. In the present
study, we investigate how older adults make end-of-life
decisions for their partners via a decision-making task and
a semi-structured interview. By taking a mixed methods
approach, we position ourselves within a pragmatist epis-
temological framework whereby we accept that qualitative
and quantitative methodologies can hold conflicting onto-
logical and epistemological assumptions, but put these
aside in our analysis to focus on addressing the research
question and its real world implications [29].
We used an expansion design with mixed methods to
extend the scope of inquiry to different inquiry compo-
nents [30], namely the outcome of the decision (quantita-
tive method) and the process of the decision (qualitative
method). Our quantitative research question was: are
people more willing to accept a life-saving risky treatment
for themselves than for their long-term partner? Given
previous findings, we expected participants to accept more
treatment for their partner, even if that means risking
their quality of life. Our qualitative research question was:
which perspectives do surrogates take when making end-
of-life decisions for their partners? We conducted in-
depth semi-structured interviews which we analysed using
a thematic analysis. We recruited older adult partners as
they are more likely to make these sorts of decisions for
each other in the near future. We could then compare
participants’ own decisions to the ones their partner made
for them to assess whether any inaccuracy is related to
failing to take a simulated perspective (i.e. decide accord-
ing to their partner’s wishes). We integrate results from
both methods in our discussion.
Method
Participants
We recruited 12 older adult partners (60–80) in long-term
relationships from Nottinghamshire, UK. Recruitment
methods included the School of Psychology’s community
sample, local University of the Third Age (U3A) branches
and word of mouth. Participants were either contacted via
email or directed to the investigators via email. Participants
took part between April and July 2018. All were able to
understand and complete the decision-making task and
take part in the interview.
Procedure
Partners were asked to come to the University of Not-
tingham together. After giving informed consent, they
took part in the study in turn, whilst their partner waited
in a separate room. Every participant completed the
decision-making task first, which was followed by a
semi-structured interview. The ethical and medical con-
text in which surrogate decisions are made were not de-
scribed to participants to avoid biasing their answers.
For example, we did not mention the substituted judg-
ment standard at any point. Participants were debriefed
together once both had completed the study.
Decision-making task
Participants completed three scenarios adapted from the
willingness to accept life-sustaining treatment (WALT) in-
strument [31] (see Supplementary File 1). Each scenario
depicted a life-threatening situation in which participants
are taken to hospital and offered a high-burden treatment
course to recover. The probability of the treatment working
varied from 90 to 10% in decrements of 10. In each case,
participants had to indicate whether they would want the
treatment or not. They were told that without the treat-
ment they would not survive. The outcome of the treat-
ment varied: either the treatment works and their current
health is restored, or it does not and they die from the
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illness (death scenario), end up bedbound (functional im-
pairment scenario) or unaware (cognitive impairment sce-
nario). The functional and cognitive impairment scenarios
allow us to examine the risk of impaired quality of life par-
ticipants are prepared to take to for a chance of living. Every
participant completed the scenarios once from their per-
spective (i.e. making decisions for themselves) and once
making decisions on behalf of their partner. The order in
which participants completed these was counterbalanced.
Quantitative analysis
To investigate self-other differences, we computed the aver-
age between the lowest chance of recovery participants ac-
cepted and the highest chance of recovery participants
refused: the point at which they were indifferent between
accepting and refusing treatment. To assess whether surro-
gate decisions were accurate, we computed the difference
between surrogate decisions and the recipient’s decisions
by subtracting the latter from the former and removing the
sign. This gave us a value representing how far surrogate
decisions deviated from the recipient’s decisions. We con-
sider a result to be statistically significant at p < .05. How-
ever, as our sample is small, we will also examine effect
sizes which can be more meaningful than p-values.
Semi-structured interviews
Participants took part in in-depth semi-structured inter-
views conducted by the first author (see Supplementary File
2 for interview guide). The questions were open-ended and
designed for participants to freely speak about their experi-
ence and thought processes in the decision-making task.
The questions were centred around three topics: recall of
surrogates’ thoughts when making decisions for their part-
ner, further exploration and discussion of their reasoning
and experience, and how their surrogates decisions com-
pared to their own decisions. Interviews ranged from 15 to
45min, were audiotaped and transcribed verbatim.
Qualitative analysis
We analysed the interview data using a thematic analysis
which allows us to identify and analyse patterns in rich de-
tail.. We were guided by an essentialist/realist epistemological
approach which reports experiences, meanings and the real-
ity of participants [32]. We interpreted participants’ motiva-
tions and experiences in a straightforward manner, assuming
a largely unidirectional relationship between their language
and the experiences they report. We took a semantic ap-
proach whereby themes were identified within the explicit
content and meanings of the data, moving from a description
to an interpretation of it. Given our interest in understanding
the perspectives participants took when making surrogate
decisions, we followed a theoretical thematic analysis driven
by the forms of perspective-taking laid out in Tunney and
Ziegler’s model [2]. This meant that, although we did not
start out with an a priori coding frame, our analysis was
driven by our theoretical interest and provided a more de-
tailed account of a particular aspect of the data, rather than a
rich description of the entire data set. We directed our ana-
lysis towards the decisions participants made for their part-
ner, rather than the ones they made for themselves, as our
research question was focused on the surrogate decision
process.
We followed the analytical steps as laid out in Braun
and Clarke [32], After transcribing the interviews, the first
author (EB), who is trained in thematic analysis, worked
through the data set to generate codes using NVivo. EB
then went through the dataset again to check that all ex-
tracts that were pertinent to our codes had been identified,
collating codes if necessary. Once the list of codes had
been generated, the coding was checked with a researcher
independent to the study (WD) who is trained and experi-
enced in a range of qualitative analysis methods. WD was
given half of the transcripts (N = 12). WD coded the tran-
scripts independently, which was then compared to EB’s
coding. EB and WD discussed discrepancies and inde-
pendently revised their coding, after which the kappa
agreement score was 0.98. After this process of triangula-
tion, EB sorted codes into potential themes by considering
how different codes might combine to form an overarch-
ing theme. EB read through the data extracts of each can-
didate theme to ensure that they formed a coherent
pattern. Next, EB considered whether the thematic map
formed a coherent representation of the entire data set by
reading through it again. Finally, EB named and defined
each theme in order to form an accompanying narrative.
Results
Participant characteristics
We recruited 12 partners (n = 24) who were all in het-
erosexual relationships. Participant characteristics can be
found in Table 1. The proportion of participants with
Table 1 Participant characteristics
Characteristic Participants
Age (in years) Mean = 67.67 (59–81)*
Gender 50% female (n = 12)
Relationship to partner
Length (in years) Mean = 41 (10–51)*
Marital status 92% married (n = 22)
Children
Children with partner 75–83% (n = 18–20)
Grandchildren from partner 42–75% (n = 10–18)
Other children/grandchildren 4% (n = 1)
*Values in parentheses refer to the range
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children and grandchildren was inferred and collated
from comments participants made during their inter-
views. It could not be exactly defined as 92% (n = 22)
mentioned children and 67% (n = 16) mentioned
grandchildren.
Quantitative findings
Given our small sample size, we took measures to en-
sure that we could draw meaningful conclusions from
our findings. We calculated the effect size we could
detect from our sample. With a sample of 18 partici-
pants, a large effect size (d > 0.80) can be detected
with adequate power (>.80) and an acceptable alpha
level (<.05) according to G*Power 3.1 [33]. We calcu-
lated post hoc power for our statistically significant
results. Further, a member of one of the dyads had
very specific health preferences, which stood in con-
trast to the rest of our sample. This was reflected in
their own choices and the ones their partner made
for them, and spoken about at length during both of
their interviews. Given that we had a small sample,
we decided to exclude this dyad from our quantitative
analyses to preserve statistical validity. This did not
have an impact on the direction of the results, as can
be seen in our analyses with the full sample in Sup-
plementary File 3.
Self-other differences
Participants’ indifference points were entered into a 2
(recipient) × 3 (outcome) repeated-measures ANOVA
(see Fig. 1). The main effect of recipient was significant
(F1,21 = 9.751, MSe = 270.455, p = .005, ηp
2 = 0.317)2: a
simple effects analysis showed that participants accepted
treatment more often for their partner than for them-
selves (mean difference = − 8.939, p = .005). The main ef-
fect of outcome was also significant (F2,42 = 22.537,
MSe = 299.747, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.518).3 According to a
simple effects analysis, participants were overall more likely
to accept treatment in the death scenario than in the func-
tional impairment scenario (mean difference = − 15.227,
p < .001) and the cognitive impairment scenario (mean dif-
ference = − 24.545, p < .001). They were also more likely to
accept treatment in the functional impairment scenario
than in the cognitive impairment scenario (mean differ-
ence = − 9.318, p = .006). The interaction between recipient
and outcome approached significance (F2,42 = 2.725,
MSe = 118.723, p = .077, ηp
2 = 0.115). Surrogates seem to
be more willing to accept a treatment for their partner than
for themselves, even if it can reduce their quality of life.
Surrogate accuracy
We examined whether surrogate accuracy significantly de-
viated from 0 using one-sample t-tests (see Fig. 2). This
was the case for death (t21 = 3.607, p = .002), functional
impairment (t21 = 6.864, p < .001) and cognitive impair-
ment (t21 = 6.410, p < .001) scenarios. To investigate
Fig. 1 Participants’ indifference points for themselves versus their partner for each treatment outcome. Lower values indicate that participants
were willing to accept a treatment with a lower chance of recovery and a higher risk of reduced quality of life. Error bars represent the standard
error of the mean
2According to a post hoc power (PHP) analysis, a sample of 22
participants was sufficient to detect an effect size of ηp
2 = 0.317 with
PHP > 0.95.
3According to a post hoc power (PHP) analysis, a sample of 22
participants was sufficient to detect an effect size of ηp
2 = 0.518 with
PHP > 0.95.
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whether accuracy differed by scenario, we conducted a
repeated-measures ANOVA with outcome as a three-level
factor. We found a main effect of outcome (F2,42 = 4.596,
MSe = 338.600, p = .016, ηp
2 = 0.180). Pairwise compari-
sons showed that accuracy in the death scenario was
higher than in the functional impairment scenario (mean
difference = − 14.091, p = .017), as well as higher than in
the cognitive impairment scenario (mean difference = −
15.000, p = .026). Accuracy between the functional and
cognitive impairment scenarios did not differ (p = .854).
These results indicate that surrogate decisions were less
likely to be accurate when the outcome involved living
with a reduced quality of life rather than death.
Qualitative findings
We identified three themes, each composed of two
sub-themes: respecting their partner’s wishes (with
sub-themes ‘beliefs’ and ‘process’), overcoming the un-
certainty (with sub-themes ‘drawing from past experi-
ences’ and ‘reproducing their own decision-making’)
and balancing perspectives (with sub-themes ‘their
partner’s best interest’ and ‘thinking about their own
interest’) (see Fig. 3).
Respecting their partner’s wishes
Participants expressed their views that surrogate deci-
sions should be made in line with the patient’s wishes.
These translated to their decision-making, as surrogates
overwhelmingly identified that their decisions were
guided by knowledge of their partner’s wishes. We split
this theme into two components: (a) beliefs and (b)
process.
Beliefs
Participants often made their belief clear that these deci-
sions ought to be made in accordance with the patient’s
wishes. It was at times explicitly stated about the deci-
sions they made for their partner, but also expressed in
relation to surrogate decision-making in general, sug-
gesting that it is strongly held and internalised: “You’re
sort of their representative in the thinking world really,
and you do what you think they would want.” Partici-
pants often believed the right decision was a decision
their partner would want: “The wrong decision would be
if you’ve taken an opportunity for them to live in a way
they wouldn’t want to live, and you’ve given it to them.”
Participants highlighted that partners should discuss
these scenarios so that they are prepared if they happen
and able to make a decision that respects their wishes:
“Well yes I do [think would be the best person to make
it], because it’s something that we’ve discussed. […] I do
think that people need to talk about these things, and I
think there’s this big taboo about people talking about
this.” Almost all participants stated that they should be
the designated surrogate because they know the recipi-
ent best.
Thinking that surrogates should know the recipient’s
wishes highlights the implicit belief that surrogate deci-
sions should be made according to these wishes. A few
participants stated that medical professionals should not
make these decisions because they do not know the pa-
tient well enough: “If you talk to one another, you know.
They know that you’ve always been active and run up
the hills, and done this and cycled, and swam or what-
ever. And you’re still doing it. And there’s a 90% chance
that you’re going to end up paralysed and lying in a bed.
Fig. 2 Surrogate inaccuracy represents the deviation in indifference points between surrogate decisions and the recipient’s decisions. Error bars
represent the standard error of the mean. Higher values indicate that surrogate decisions were less accurate
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There’s no way you’d want that. But the doctor might say
‘well, you know, I’ve got to save a life’. […] So you’ve got
to be able to say to the doctor they wouldn’t want their
life saving.”
Process
Most participants’ intention was to make a decision that
respected their partner’s wishes. This was spontaneously
reported by participants and usually constituted their an-
swer to the first question posed to them (i.e. to walk the
interviewer through their thought process). They often
explicitly stated that they reflected on what they thought
their partner would want in order to make a decision for
them: “I was trying to imagine if it wasn’t me making the
decision, but it was their independent decision, what they
would like to happen. And obviously I would make that
decision for them based on those thoughts.” Participants
usually referred to their partner’s wishes to justify their
decisions. Many spoke at length about what their part-
ner would want in each scenario and based their deci-
sions on this.
Even when participants did not know their partner’s
wishes on the matter, they sometimes tried to make a
judgment based on their wider knowledge of their part-
ner: “My partner is the type of person who would defin-
itely want to try everything. […] So I just ticked
everything, it’s as simple as that. I don’t know his
thoughts on that at all, because he’s a man who never
talks about anything personal, so I have no idea on his
thoughts and ideas of anything like that at all, so I’ve just
had to guess.” This suggests a three-step process to their
decision-making: having the intention to decide accord-
ing to what their partner wants, recalling knowledge of
their partner’s wishes, and searching for other clues in
their partner’s thoughts and behaviours that might be in-
dicative of their wishes. For partners who might not dis-
cuss their health preferences, they might not be able to
recall knowledge of their partner’s wishes and have to
rely on step 3 to infer their wishes.
In terms of how participants felt towards this process,
one mentioned they would not feel guilty because they
knew they chose what their partner would want, whereas
another felt guilty for not doing so. Participants also felt
more confident about their decisions when they knew
they had taken their partner’s wishes into account. This
made their decision process easier and made them feel
like they made the right decision: “I’m quite confident
that he’d be the same, that he would feel that I’m making
the right decisions. […] Because that’s how we believe life
is, you know. We don’t want to survive if we’re mentally
or physically, you know.” Conversely, when comparing
the process of deciding for their partner to the process
for themselves, participants often mentioned that it was
more difficult for their partner because they were less
sure of their partner’s wishes than their own: “What if
you got it totally wrong? What if they wouldn’t mind be-
ing stuck in that bed and they’d take a 10% chance of it
working alright? And 90% chance of being stuck in a
bed? What if they wouldn’t mind that but you said ‘let
them die’. […] I think I’d know for myself at what point I
would cut off, I’d say ‘no this is enough’. Weighting it all
up, the effect on my family, the effect on me, I’d know.
But I can’t see inside somebody else’s head. I can’t can I.
I can assume I know what they want, even though I’ve
known her a few years. I can’t guarantee it.”
Overcoming the uncertainty
Participants overwhelmingly expressed the burden that
surrogate decisions involve. Despite feeling like they
knew their partner’s wishes, that there was still a level of
uncertainty. One spoke of there always being a ‘nagging
doubt’, whereas their own decisions were ‘cast-iron’. Par-
ticipants stressed it was difficult to judge the level of risk
their partner would be prepared to take, making the cut-
off point challenging to establish: “The one that was
quite challenging was where do you cut off the risk of the
treatment not working and leaving somebody stuck in
bed but aware? What sort of cut off level? When you’ve
Fig. 3 A map of the theme structure generated by our analysis of participants’ interviews
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got 20% chance of walking out here fit and well, if we
don’t treat you you’re going to die, if we do treat it there’s
an 80% chance of you ending up in that bed there, and
having it out again. And you’re thinking, you know, 1 in
5, is it worth it? 1 in 10, is that worth it? Is it worth try-
ing? That was difficult.” Participants had to resort to
other sources of information to guide their decision-
making and ease the process: (a) their past experiences
and (b) their own decision-making.
Drawing from past experiences
Participants drew from a pool of past experiences
they shared with their partner to inform their
decision-making, namely life events and discussions
concerning illness and end-of-life care. Many spoke of
their close relatives or friends who had experienced
reduced quality of life and expressed theirs and their
partner’s strong wish to not find themselves in those
states. This seemed to shift their focus towards qual-
ity of life when making decisions, rather than the
mere preference for life itself: “I think if she was very
ill, and ended up having her quality of life reduced as
such that she couldn’t get out the house, or walk, or ride a
bike, or do anything, she’d want to die. She’d say ‘I’ve got
no life, I’ve got no quality, I’ve got nothing’. […] Looking
after her father that’s 80 something. She’s having to go out
and sort him out, all the time. […] And she’s seen it from
that end, and she’s seen what it does to other people. So I
don’t think she’d do it.”
On occasion, participants had been surrogates for fam-
ily members, which they reported influenced their deci-
sions. A few had worked in the care system and had
witnessed patients at the end-of-life as well as families
having to make these decisions. These experiences
shaped their outlook on end-of-life care, which made
them more aware of these issues and likely to discuss
them with their partner, which was identified as guiding
their decision-making: “So many people don’t [discuss
this]. […] there’s a lot of people out there that don’t even
go there. Don’t think about it, the consequences. Until
you’re in… But I think because we think ahead, so you
think that it’s easier to make that decision.”
Recalling these discussions reassured them and con-
firmed that they were making an accurate decision,
which eased the decision process: “We’re in a good pos-
ition because we’ve talked about it before, so decisions
are somewhat easier than if it just came out of the blue
and then I’d have to decide.” They anticipated they
would give them the courage to make that decision in
real life: “A lot of the decisions that are made are to pro-
long a person’s death, and then they’re not given a com-
fortable death at the end of it, because people are too
frightened to take the decisions on their behalf, because
they would feel guilty. Whereas it’s something that we
have discussed, between ourselves and with our children.”
However, there were cases where participants had not
had these discussions and would not feel up to making
these decisions: “It is like ‘do you pull the plug on life
support’. No I couldn’t. I couldn’t. To me it would be like
shooting him, stabbing him, I can’t do that. I couldn’t do
that to anybody. And that’s really hard. Had he told me
his thoughts before, then that would be something
different.”
Reproducing their own decision-making
Many participants reported sharing similar views to their
partner regarding end-of-life, meaning they could refer
to their own thoughts to inform their judgment about
their partner’s: “I know that the reason that I put the
same for him as I would for me, is because that’s how he
would feel in the same way. So we’d both do similar
things I think. It’s just where the cut off would be”. Most
mentioned they did not consider each scenario to be
equivalent, both for them or their partner. Their own
reasoning for each scenario was therefore applied when
making surrogate decisions: “On the first page, the treat-
ment, you know, it will either work or it won’t work. Well
yes, you go for everything. If it’s there, go for it, there’s al-
ways a chance. The second one where you would be bed-
bound, you’ve still got a life, and I would always be there
to look after him, if not there would be other people… We
have family. And I think both of us want to see our
grandchildren grow up, whatever, so the bedbound bit,
yeah, go for it, really. Because it could work, that’s the
thing, it could work.” Finally, participants’ judgment
about the risk of the treatment not working (i.e. not
leading to a complete recovery) was applied to both their
own and surrogate choices. Interestingly, individual par-
ticipants reported very different judgments about what
an acceptable level of risk is, as depicted in Table 2.
Table 2 Judgments about the risk of the treatment not
working across participants
High risk “10% chance is still a chance, so you’ve got to take
that chance. If you say 90% chance you might be
bedbound, well fine we can always get assistance
to help you with that. The ultimate thing is, without
the treatment, you’re gone, so a 10% chance has to
be taken really.”
Medium risk [speaking about the surrogate decisions] “I think
on all the questions I went down to the 50/50, and
that would be my final gamble. If it was 50% chance,
you might as well take it. Less than 50, I just said no.”
Low risk “I think, I sort of, more for the physical, I probably
gave, slightly… I mean I think it was only 80/90,
sorry 80/90% chance you get a full recovery. But
otherwise, no. Because I think then you’re getting
into the realms that, you know, you’re getting the
higher risk chance that you are.”
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Balancing perspectives
Most participants were also driven by other factors than
their partner’s wishes, even if they did consider them.
This meant that they had to find the right balance when
making their final decision: “I think it’s weighing up the
risk, and your wishes and your partner’s wishes.” Having
to balance these different perspectives implied that they
thought more about their surrogate decisions than their
own and incorporated more factors into their decision
process: [asked about any difficulties] “No, not for myself,
no. Think that was simple enough. […] There was a lot
more thought [for my partner], more thought came into
it. I thought would the girls want me to do, my two
daughters, things like that you know. Then I thought
about the wife again – well she wouldn’t want that any-
way. Things like that.” Participants were particularly
keen to consider: (a) the partner’s best interest and (b)
their own interest.
Their partner’s best interest
Participants mentioned having their partner’s best interest
at heart, which led them to consider the option most
beneficial to their partner’s quality of life. Occasionally,
they were more focused on a benevolent than a simulated
perspective. Not letting their partner suffer was particu-
larly important. In fact, participants sometimes considered
the right decision as dependent on its outcome, rather
than the way in which it was made: “You might admit the
wrong decision if it turned out that she would be in a ter-
rible state, you know bed-ridden, in a dire nursing home
where there’s no nurses to clear her up.”
Overall, participants were more willing to have their
partner treated than themselves. Deciding about some-
one else’s life, rather than their own, meant that they
really did not want to get it wrong. It pushed them to
give their partner a better chance of living: “I was more
inclined to let them have the treatment. Just to give them
a fighting chance. But for myself, no.” A few mentioned
that the mental capacity of their partner would affect
their decision. They referred to conflicts between a rela-
tive’s past and present wishes, in cases where they had
lost their decision-making capacity. In such situations,
participants might override their partner’s wishes to
make a decision that is in their best interest: “So I think
you have to respect decisions, but there comes a point
maybe, if my wife said she wanted to be resuscitated in-
definitely on a dementia ward, you’d have to say ‘I think
it’s time to override that’. […] She’d have to have gone
past the point of being able to make a rational decision.”
Finally, participants insisted on taking into account the
wishes of the family. These decisions obviously have
consequences for them and they thought they should be
consulted and considered during the decision process: “I
had to really sit and try and imagine, you know, could I
go through that, could his family go through the fact it
didn’t work. The risk of the disruption to our lives and
family’s lives, because we have someone in that
predicament.”
Thinking about their own interest
Participants clearly did not want to lose their partner
and were impacted by that prospect when making their
decisions: “I think we’ve both got the same concerns of be-
ing alive and immobile. So that leaves the same worry.
But selfish reasons may push me on to have her treated
at worse odds than what I would. But that would be self-
ish reasons again. Nothing else.” This feeling was quite
strong in a couple of participants who chose to treat
their partner a lot more than themselves: “I would go for
a much lower percentage with him, and that’s purely
emotional because I don’t want to lose him. I’m willing to
risk that lower percentage, but I don’t think he would.”
Some mentioned that the emotional turmoil of the deci-
sion in real life would make it even harder for them to
reject a life-saving treatment: “I suspect when you’re
faced with it, life is very precious. Fear of death is very
real.”
Participants often had to weigh their own wishes
against their partner’s, making it difficult to strike the
balance. This led them to make a decision in line with
their partner’s wishes, but slightly adjusted to give them
a better chance of living: “I know he would not want to
live a very restricted life, or if he didn’t have his mental
faculties, he wouldn’t want that. But then if there’s still a
chance of, you know, a recovery if you like, I think I
would want that. So it’s weighing that up.” Participants
also considered the impact that their partner’s illness
would have on their own life. This sometimes tipped the
balance the other way in favour of taking less treatment,
because a functional or cognitive impairment might be
too burdensome on them and the family.
Participants occasionally viewed the responsibility
placed on them as a burden, but were prepared to take
that responsibility and stand by their decisions: “These
are big decisions and I think you’d certainly be account-
able and responsible for it. You might have regrets but at
least you could look bad and say ‘well I did this in her
best interests’.” However, they were sometimes inclined
to let their partner be treated to a greater extent than
themselves because of that responsibility: “For him, I
would say have the treatment, have it have it have it. It
could work, it could work, and that would always be… I
wouldn’t want to be the one to say ‘no’.” That responsi-
bility was occasionally mentioned as what made the de-
cision process more difficult for their partner than for
themselves: “Because once you’re gone you’re gone, and I
can’t bring that back. And if I’m the one who’s making
the decisions on his behalf, then that’s almost even
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trickier I think, because you’re making the decision for
somebody else, and you’ve got to live with that as well.”
Although most made references to an egocentric per-
spective, it was not usually prioritised over their part-
ner’s wishes. They were still capable of setting aside
their selfish motives in cases where they strongly con-
flicted with their partner’s wishes: “If I was purely, if I
was very selfish and just thought of me, it would be to-
tally different. […] I have different attitudes to it, the
thought of somebody being bedridden and have not com-
pos mentis at all, I think that’s pointless.” Crucially, it
was recognised that knowing what their partner would
want makes it easier to avoid falling into deciding based
on selfish reasons: “If I didn’t know what I know, then
obviously you’d fight to save your partner’s life wouldn’t
you. To keep them with you. But I know that’s not what
he wants.”
Discussion
Bringing our findings together
Participants were more inclined to accept a life-saving
treatment for others than for themselves, which is in line
with previous research showing that people are more
likely to favour a life-saving choice for others. This is
concurrent with participants reporting they did not want
to lose their partner and felt that they should give them
a chance of living. We found discrepancies between sur-
rogates’ choices and those made by the recipient, indi-
cating evidence of surrogate inaccuracy. However, these
results alone do not indicate whether participants
intended to go against their partner’s wishes: some
might have made a best-informed guess from their
knowledge of their partner but got it wrong, whereas
others could have known what their partner wanted but
chose to make a different decision. Indeed, surrogates
reported taking a variety of perspectives to inform their
decision-making. Nevertheless, the majority of surro-
gates intended to decide according to their partner’s
wishes and held beliefs that aligned with the ethical un-
derpinnings of the substituted judgment standard.
Most participants held the view that they would rather
die than end up with a severely compromised quality of
life, and showed that they knew their partner did too.
Crucially, this indicates that the source of surrogate in-
accuracy might not reside in the fact that surrogates
misjudged their partners’ preferences concerning the
choice outcomes, but rather that they misjudged their
risk preferences. Surrogates did find the cut off level dif-
ficult to judge for their partner. Although the reports
showed that participants overall held similar views re-
garding quality of life, they held quite different intuitions
regarding the percentage risk that would be ‘too risky’. It
is likely that they believed their partner would hold the
same intuitions and would only majorly adjust their risk
preference if they thought their partner’s wishes differed
from their own.
Using a mixed methods approach has enabled us to
consider both the process and the outcome of the deci-
sion in greater depth. The investigation of self-other dif-
ferences on their own is nowhere near sufficient to
understand surrogate decision-making. Drawing from
participants’ reports is necessary to address the complex
processes at play. Similarly, identifying how participants’
reports match up to the decisions they made allowed for
further nuance in understanding their decision process.
Theoretical implications
Our findings lend support to predictions made by Tun-
ney and Ziegler’s model [2] (detailed in the Background
section). Indeed, we found that surrogates intended to
make a simulated decision for their partner in end-of-
life scenarios. However, no matter how well surrogates
felt like they knew their partner’s wishes, there was a
remaining level of uncertainty for some which they had
to overcome. They therefore drew on their own
decision-making, which is in line with Tunney and Zieg-
ler’s [2]prediction that surrogates might default to a pro-
jected perspective. Moreover, participants considered a
benevolent perspective by thinking about whether the
treatment they would put their partner through was in
their best interest. Finally, participants took an egocen-
tric perspective when thinking about their own wishes
for their partner.
It is clear that surrogate decisions can be a lot more
complex than suggested by the theories we outlined in
the introduction, namely hot-cold empathy gaps [25],
the risk-as-feelings hypothesis [26] and social values the-
ory [28]. Even though self-other differences might seem
like they can be explained by these accounts, neither are
able to capture the complexity of the decision process
and the intricacies across surrogates’ experiences. Tun-
ney and Ziegler’s model [2] is far more able to highlight
these details.
Practical implications
Participants spontaneously indicated a willingness to
honour their partner’s wishes, meaning that the funda-
mentals of the substituted judgement standard are not
necessarily misguided and should not be done away with
as an ethical framework. However, the problems previ-
ously raised about the substituted judgment standard
were highlighted in our study. Surrogates found it diffi-
cult to ignore other factors, such as what they want for
their partner. A few mentioned that if their partner’s
present wishes were considered unreasonable or discord-
ant with their past wishes, they would override them.
Expecting the surrogate to make a decision they deem
unreasonable magnifies the burden placed on them.
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Participants also conjectured that it would be more diffi-
cult to follow in actual fact due to emotional influences,
which is reflected in studies of surrogate decisions after
the fact [4, 8]. The present study therefore shows that, in
principle, surrogates would like to follow the substituted
judgment standard, but this is not always achievable in
practice.
Another problem with the substituted judgment stand-
ard is that it is entirely focused on the patient and does
not address the burden on the decision-maker. Partici-
pants who had not had previous discussions with their
partner were in the dark about their partner’s wishes,
whereas those who had were more confident and com-
fortable with their decisions. Encouraging people to have
these discussions in the later part of their lives would be
a good strategy to ease the process. Indeed, a retired
health care professional insisted that these discussions
between family members do not happen enough prior to
the event. Promoting advance care planning practices
could be a way to encourage people to discuss their
healthcare preferences with their loved ones. To be most
effective, it should consider factors which can help sur-
rogates make decisions in all kinds of scenarios, such as
the chance of recovery following treatment as our study
shows that partners may not be aware they have differ-
ent risk preferences.
Limitations
Our study used hypothetical scenarios. Although some
participants were certain they would make the same de-
cisions in real life, it was apparent that others were not.
Some mentioned that the fear of death would be more
imminent in a real scenario, and although they would
like to think that they would stick to their current deci-
sions, they felt that they might be led towards a different
direction. Indeed, in reports which took place after the
fact, the tensions felt by surrogates which prevented
them from honouring the recipient’s wishes were more
apparent [4, 8, 9].
Our findings might not be easily generalisable to the
wider population. It is conceivable that the surrogate de-
cision differs by demographic (education, socioeconomic
status, religion etc). Although we did not collect exten-
sive demographic information, it can be inferred that
participants were numerically literate given that they
were all able to complete the task which involved mak-
ing judgments about probabilities. Moreover, most par-
ticipants were open to speaking about end-of-life. The
recruitment process clearly stated that the study would
involve thinking about severe illnesses and death, which
would have discouraged those unwilling to do so. The
participants we recruited would presumably be more
likely to have these discussions with their partner. Par-
ticipants who are less numerically literate and open to
speaking about end-of-life might have made different de-
cisions. Future research should be extended to different
populations to investigate whether their decision process
is different to our findings.
Conclusions
Taking a mixed methods approach enabled us to bring
together two facets of surrogate decision-making and
their respective literatures. Surrogates did believe that
end-of-life decisions for their partner should respect
their partner’s wishes, which suggests that the
substituted judgment standard is not necessarily inad-
equate. On the other hand, it is clear that surrogates also
incorporate other perspectives in their decision-making
and cannot entirely put their own wishes aside. We
showed that manifestations of surrogate inaccuracy are
not necessarily due to surrogates failing to decide ac-
cording to their partner’s wishes. Instead, it could be
due to individual differences in risk preferences rather
than simply a misjudgement of the recipient’s wishes.
Future research should further explore the sources of in-
accuracy to help surrogates make better informed judg-
ments about their partner’s wishes. Finally, our study
suggests that surrogates draw from prior discussions
with their partner, which give them the confidence that
they are making the right decision. Future work should
investigate whether encouraging families to speak about
end-of-life makes the process less conflictual, distressing
and uncertain.
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